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As other contributors to this symposium have observed, recent
decisions from the Supreme Court make painfully clear that there are
unconstitutional ways to establish race-based affirmative action pro-
grams. But, surprisingly enough, an older line of Court cases suggests
that there are unconstitutional ways to disestablish such programs as
well. And the California Civil Rights Initiative ("CCRI"),' a pro-
posed amendment to the California Constitution on this November's
ballot, may be just such a way.
We explore this possibility, focusing on subdivision (a) of the
CCRI: "The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential
treatment to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color,
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting."2 Subdivision (a) comprises
both an antidiscrimination component and an antipreference compo-
nent. The former component, which erects a per se bar to all race
discrimination against minorities, is undoubtedly constitutional.3
The antipreference component-which prohibits the State from
according preferential treatment to individuals based on their race-
would outlaw some activity that is currently consistent with the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.4 Under current law,
state and local governments may employ racial classifications in-
tended to advantage racial minorities if the classifications are nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest (the "strict scrutiny"
standard).5 Subdivision (a)'s antipreference component precludes
these voluntary affirmative action programs, notwithstanding their
permissibility under the Fourteenth Amendment.6 The question we
1. Bill Jones, Secretary of State, Proposition 209, in CALIFORNIA BALLOT PAmPHLET,
GENERAL ELECrION, NOVEMBER 5, 1996 (forthcoming Sept. 1996) [hereinafter Proposi-
tion 209].
2. 1d
3. For ease of exposition, we use race as a shorthand for "race .... color, ethnicity, or
national origin ... ." Id.
4. U.S. CONsT. amend XIV.
5. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (Shaw /); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
6. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Impact of the California Civil Rights Initiative,
23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. - (1996) (describing programs foreclosed by the CCRI). Our
argument takes swing-vote Justice O'Connor at her word when, in Adarand Constructors
v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995), she observed that strict scrutiny for affirmative action
programs need not be fatal. See id. at 2114, 2117. She made clear that strict scrutiny will
not necessarily invalidate legitimate remedial programs as it would naked race discrimina-
tion. See id. at 2114 ("According to Justice Stevens [in dissent], our view of consistency
'equates remedial preferences with invidious discrimination, and ignores the difference be-
tween ... a No Trespassing sign and a welcome mat.' It does nothing of the kind.... It
says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is the job
address today is whether this preclusion is permissible under the
Court's equal protection jurisprudence.
Specifically, this Article focuses on a challenge to the CCRI
based on three cases which we sometimes refer to as the "Hunter tril-
ogy": Hunter v. Erickson;7 Washington v. Seattle School District No.
1;8 and Crawford v. Board of Education.9 We feel this challenge is
quite powerful, and it should move a lower court to invalidate the
CCRI on federal constitutional grounds. The CCRI singles out race
and treats it differently from any other criterion for public employ-
ment, education, and contracting decisions. In doing so, the CCRI
isolates an issue of special interest to minorities-affirmative action
programs designed to remedy past racial wrongs and bring minorities
together with nonminorities in educational and vocational settings-
and relegates this issue to the highest and most entrenched level of
governmental decisionmaking. This would seem to violate the Equal
Protection Clause as interpreted by the Court in the Hunter trilogy.
To be sure, there are several important and complicated steps along
the way in this argument, some of which legitimately require the exer-
cise of political as well as doctrinal judgment. But in the end,
although the question is far from easy, we feel a faithful and sophisti-
cated application of the Hunter cases cuts against the constitutionality
of the CCRI.
Before we begin, let us make clear the limited nature of our
claim. In this Article, we mean neither to question, nor to defend, the
correctness of the Hunter trilogy. Instead, we seek to dissect and un-
derstand the Court's language and reasoning in order to see how a
state or lower federal court should measure the CCRI against these
cases. To do that, we necessarily try to provide the most intelligible
and coherent readings of them. We also consider, as would a lower
court, how recent Supreme Court cases outside the Hunter trilogy
might or might not bear on its application. The observations we make
could, of course, affect one's views on whether the Supreme Court
would, or should, maintain the Hunter cases as good law. But because
our focus is not on how the Court itself would or should evaluate the
of the court applying strict scrutiny.") (citations omitted); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 493;
Akhil R. Amar & Neal K. Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 U.C.L.A. L. REv. (forthcoming 1996).
If we are wrong in taking O'Connor at her word, and if in reality there are no race-based
preferences consistent with the United States Constitution, the CCRI becomes truly
irrelevant.
7. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
8. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
9. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
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Hunter cases, but rather on how a lower court should faithfully apply
them, a full-fledged normative assessment of these cases must await
another day.
We proceed with our analysis as follows. Part I, Section A con-
tains a brief discussion of conventional equal protection cases con-
cerning facial racial discrimination and illicit motive. In Section B, we
introduce the special legal doctrine established by the Hunter trilogy.
This Section examines the cases and reveals a two-pronged doctrinal
test: Hunter and its progeny render unconstitutional state laws that
both (i) are "racial in character" in a special sense and (ii) specially
burden a racial minority's exercise of political power. In Part II, we
elaborate and apply the first prong of the Hunter test to conclude that
the CCRI is "racial in character." Part III then explains how the
CCRI discriminatorily imposes the sort of political process burden
that, under existing caselaw, should trigger strict scrutiny. Part IV
then briefly considers whether the CCRI can satisfy the strict scrutiny
standard.10
I. Equal Protection Analysis and the Hunter Doctrine
A. Conventional Equal Protection Analysis
Under conventional equal protection analysis, a statute or state
constitutional provision is subject to strict scrutiny if, on its face, it
classifies on the basis of race." The CCRI on its face does not em-
body a race classification in this conventional sense, because it does
not single out any particular race for differential treatment, nor does it
make a person's race relevant to the receipt of any benefit or imposi-
tion of any burden. (To the contrary, it purports to make one's race
10. We focus on the CCRI's impact on race rather than sex for three reasons. First,
the Hunter trilogy addresses only the former. Second, subdivision (c) makes unclear how
much sex-based affirmative action is foreclosed by the CCRL See infra notes 71-73 and
accompanying text. Third, because discrimination against women triggers intermediate
rather than strict scrutiny, a Hunter challenge to the CCRI's provision on sex could suc-
ceed only where a challenge to the provision on race would succeed as well. For this latter
reason, it is unclear whether an equal protection challenge to the sex provision would add
anything, because a successful challenge to the race provision might invalidate the sex pro-
vision as well. Subdivision (h) of the CCRI contains a severability clause, which purports
to save as much of the initiative as possible in the event that "any part or parts" are invali-
dated. If the prohibition on racial affirmative action were invalidated under the Hunter
doctrine, it is unclear whether the provision on preferences for women would remain
standing as a severable "part" of the initiative. The answer would depend on general sev-
erability principles of California law, as well as an interpretation of subdivision (h). Our
initial sense is that the dual aspects of the antipreference provision are sufficiently linked
so that they would not be considered severable under state law.
11. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
completely irrelevant to the receipt of public education, employment,
or contracts.)
Even a facially neutral law is constitutionally flawed if the pur-
pose or motive behind the law's enactment is to disadvantage racial
minorities. 2 A successful challenge along these lines requires a dem-
onstration that the relevant lawmakers-in this case the voters enact-
ing the CCRI-"selected... a particular course of action at least in
part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon" a
traditionally disadvantaged group. 13 Such a showing of invidious in-
tent or motive behind subdivision (a) of the CCRI would, we feel, be
very hard to make. To begin with, people might support subdivision
(a) to endorse the antidiscrimination provision, and thus vote for the
CCRI "in spite of" rather than "because of" any antiminority message
sent or effect created by the antipreference portion of the measure.
Moreover, there are several noninvidious reasons that could mo-
tivate people to support even the antipreference component of the
CCRI itself. Two readily apparent justifications are notions of funda-
mental fairness and concerns about economic efficiency. As to fair-
ness, some people sincerely believe that affirmative action preferences
for minorities are morally objectionable in precisely the same way as
is conventional discrimination against these groups. For them, using
membership in a group defined by immutable criteria to distribute
either benefits or burdens is presumptively unjust. And race and gen-
der preference programs are the two most common departures from
the so-called individual (as distinguished from group) equality norm.
From this perspective, the inclusion of some sex provisions in addition
to the race provisions in the CCRI demonstrates the sincerity of the
decision to reject programs based on group equality theories.
As to efficiency, some people worry that affirmative action pref-
erences substantially undercut economic growth because the "best
persons" are not doing the jobs or filling the classrooms. That prefer-
ence beneficiaries are in some sense minimally "qualified" does noth-
ing to blunt this comparative argument.
Finally, some might believe that public consideration of race,
even when benignly motivated, is inherently stigmatic, divisive, and
dangerous public policy. Such "color-blind" advocates might plausi-
bly believe that while affirmative action programs benefit minorities
and society in some ways, such programs do more damage than they
are worth. In short-and to (mis)paraphrase Justice Blackmun in Re-
12. See, eg., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
13. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
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gents of the University of California v. Bakke' 4 -to get beyond race,
we must first get beyond race.
For these reasons, we think a court would have a very hard time
invalidating the CCRI under conventional equal protection doctrines
concerning facial discrimination or illicit motive. Nevertheless, the
CCRI is vulnerable to attack under a less familiar and more nuanced
branch of equal protection doctrine, to which we now turn.
B. The Hunter Framework
The Hunter doctrine emerges from a line of cases in which the
Court has held unconstitutional certain changes in the structure of a
state's or city's political processes-changes that isolate public policy
decisions intrinsically important to racial minorities and make more
difficult success by these groups in legislative politics. Each of the
cases in which the Court has fleshed out the doctrine warrants particu-
lar discussion.
In Hunter v. Erickson,5 the Court first gave "clear[ ] expression"
to the principle that equal protection may be violated by "subtl[e] dis-
tortions [in] governmental processes [that operate to] place special
burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legisla-
tion." 6 In Hunter, the people of Akron, responding to a fair housing
ordinance enacted by the City Council, amended the city charter to
prevent the implementation of any fair housing ordinance that had
failed to gain the express approval of a majority of Akron voters. The
amended charter defined the ordinances that were to be subject to the
newly created popular approval requirement as those laws regulating
real estate transactions "on the basis of race, color, religion, national
origin or ancestry. . . ."' The charter amendment "not only sus-
pended the operation of the existing ordinance forbidding housing dis-
crimination, but also required approval of the electors before any
future [housing discrimination] ordinance could take effect."'18
By a vote of eight to one, the Court struck down the charter
amendment as violative of equal protection. The Court declined to
rest its decision on a finding of invidious intent. Instead, the Court
subjected the law to strict scrutiny (which it could not survive) be-
14. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
15. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
16. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1,458 U.S. 457,467 (1982) (describing origins
of Hunter doctrine).
17. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387.
18. Id. at 389-90.
1024
cause the law effectively drew a "racial classification [which] treat[ed]
racial housing matters differently [and less favorably]" than other
matters. 19 The Court found it crucial that the law, while neutral on its
face in the sense that it drew no distinctions among racial and reli-
gious groups, would nonetheless uniquely disadvantage beneficiaries
of antidiscrimination laws (i.e., minorities) by forcing such laws to run
a legislative gauntlet of popular approval that other laws-and thus
other interest groups-were spared.
In Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1,20 the Court applied
and extended Hunter. In order to cure widespread de facto racial seg-
regation in Seattle area schools, Seattle School District No. 1 adopted
a voluntary integration plan that extensively used pupil reassignment
and busing to eliminate one-race schools. The Seattle program
prompted the people of Washington to enact Initiative 350. On its
face, the Initiative provided broadly that "no school board.., shall
directly or indirectly require any student to attend a school other than
[the geographically closest school]."'" The Initiative, however, then
set out so many exceptions to this prohibition that the effect on local
school boards was to bar them from ordering reassignment or busing
for the purpose of racial integration, but to permit them to order reas-
signment or busing for all other educationally valid reasons. As the
Supreme Court put it:
[Tihe initiative was directed solely at desegregative busing in
general, and at the Seattle plan in particular. Thus, "except for
the assignment of students to effect racial balancing, the drafters
of Initiative 350 attempted to preserve to school districts the
maximum flexibility in the assignment of students."'
On a five to four vote, the Court struck down the plebiscite. As
in Hunter, the Court declined to rest its holding on a finding of invidi-
ous intent. Instead, the Court invalidated Initiative 350 because it
specially removed racial busing-a program of particular importance
to racial minorities-from the control of local decisionmaking bodies
and shifted it to central management at the statewide level, where mi-
norities were less likely to enjoy democratic success. This selective
and unfavorable treatment of public programs that were beneficial to
minorities denied such minorities the equal protection right to "full
participation in the political life of the community."2
19. Id at 389.
20. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
21. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.26.010 (1981).
22. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 463 (quoting district court opinion).
23. Id. at 467.
1025Summer 19961
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The third case in the Hunter trilogy, Crawford v. Board of Educa-
tion,' was a companion case to Seattle. While the case involved su-
perficially similar facts, the Court voted eight to one to reject the
Hunter-based challenge to a California initiative. Crawford involved
the validity of Proposition I, an amendment to the California Consti-
tution enacted by the electorate in response to state court decisions
interpreting the California Constitution to require the state to remedy
de facto as well as de jure school segregation. To overrule these judi-
cial decisions, Proposition I provided that
[N]o court of this state may impose upon the State [or any state
entity or official] any obligation or responsibility [in the name of
the state constitution] with respect to the use of pupil school
assignment or pupil transportation [except to remedy a specific
action by the State that would violate the federal equal protec-
tion clause such that a federal court could impose the obligation
as a remedy.]
In rejecting the Hunter-based challenge to Proposition I, the
Crawford Court found that the "elements underlying the holding in
Hunter [were] missing."'26 In particular, Proposition I's classification
was not "racial" in the same way that the charter amendment in
Hunter was. Moreover, the Crawford Court reasoned, Proposition I
did not disable minorities from enacting racial busing programs legis-
latively, but rather merely "repealed" the existing state constitutional
requirement of these programs that California had no federal obliga-
tion to provide. The lack of both a racial character and a political
process burden thus served to distinguish and save Proposition I.
Throughout this trilogy, the Court has applied (with varying de-
grees of clarity) a two-pronged test. First, a challenger must show that
the law in question is "racial" or "race-based" in "character," in that it
singles out for special treatment issues that are particularly associated
with minority interests. Second, the challenger must show that the law
imposes an unfair political process burden with regard to these "mi-
nority issues" by entrenching their unfavorable resolution. Strict scru-
tiny is triggered only if the challenger satisfies both parts of the test.27
24. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
25. Id. at 532.
26. Id. at 537 n.14.
27. See id. (charter amendment's presumptive invalidity in Hunter followed from "'the
reality ... that the law's impact falls on the minority' ... and the distortion of the political
process worked by the" amendment) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); Seattle, 458 U.S.
at 470 (constitutional flaw in Initiative 350 is that it "uses the racial nature of an issue to
define the governmental decisionmaking structure, and thus imposes substantial and
unique [political] burdens on racial minorities."); Hunter, 393 U.S. at 389-90
A law that imposes special political process burdens on classes not
defined by race does not directly implicate the trilogy. 8 Similarly, a
law that deals explicitly with "racial" issues but does not impose any
entrenching political process burdens is also unproblematic.
The central idea behind this line of cases is relatively straightfor-
ward: Just as minorities cannot be singled out for substantively infer-
ior treatment-say, subjected to a unique sales tax-neither can they
be singled out and relegated to inferior treatment in the political pro-
cess-say, subjected to a race-based poll tax. Consider the following
(and extreme) hypothetical: A state constitutional provision that re-
quires a 90% legislative supermajority vote for any "law that benefits
persons of color." That provision is obviously problematic because its
text explicitly defines the provision's scope in terms of minority inter-
ests, and because the high supermajority requirement obviously im-
poses a substantial burden.
The Hunter line of cases is controversial in large part because the
cases do not concern laws whose very scope is explicitly defined in
terms of minority interests. The laws in question did not expressly sin-
gle out minorities at all, but instead singled out issues that the Court
deemed to be of particular interest to minorities. The equal protection
vice found by the Court in these cases is thus more subtle than that
plaguing the hypotheticals in the preceding paragraph.
Indeed, one might well wonder whether the Supreme Court
would embrace such a context-sensitive doctrine if Hunter or Seattle
arose for the first time today. In a recent series of cases involving
government contracting2 9 and electoral districting,30 the Court has
held that all racial classifications must satisfy strict scrutiny-"whether
or not the reason for the racial classification is benign or the purpose
remedial."' 31 These cases reflect an equal protection doctrine that em-
("Here, . .. there was a ... racial classification [that] treat[s] racial housing matters differ-
ently [and subjects them to a unique procedural] gauntlet.").
28. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (suggesting that Hunter line of cases is
limited to race-sensitive issues). But see Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270 (Colo. 1993) (Ev-
ans 1) (extending Hunter line to protect gays and lesbians).
29. See Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (overruling Metro Broad-
casting, Inc., v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990)); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989).
30. See Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Shaw v. Hunt, 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996)
(Shaw 11); Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)
(Shaw 1).
31. Shaw 1I, 116 S. Ct. at 1900.
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braces formally symmetrical rules governing members of all races,32
and the cases seemingly downplay the significance of traditional con-
textual concerns such as the political power or historical oppression of
the burdened group. The "feel" of these recent decisions thus di-
verges from the more nuanced and asymmetrical "feel" of Hunter and
Seattle. On the other hand, as we noted earlier, the application of
strict scrutiny to facial classifications need not be symmetrical at all.33
Moreover, the Court's articulated concern for symmetry has thus far
been limited to facially discriminatory classifications, leaving open the
possibility that the Court would, in a case of first impression arising
today, eschew absolute symmetry where necessary to respond to more
subtle forms of discrimination.34 In light of this possibility and the
doctrine of stare decisis, it would be quite adventurous to predict that
the Court today would overrule rather than maintain the Hunter
framework.
In any event, our focus in this Article is on how a state or lower
federal court should apply the Hunter framework to the CCRI.
Lower courts are generally obligated to interpret and apply existing
Supreme Court precedents faithfully, having little discretion to deter-
mine that old precedent has lost its binding force.3 5 Indeed, the Court
has expressly cautioned that "[i]f a precedent of this Court has direct
application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some
other line of decisions, the [lower court] should follow the case which
directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions. '3 6 And nothing in the recent Supreme Court cases
concerning explicit racial classifications is directly incompatible with
the articulated Hunter framework. Thus, lower courts remain obli-
gated to administer this framework fully and fairly when assessing the
CCRI. We consider a bit later how a lower court might try to incorpo-
32. See, e.g., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2111 ("'the standard of review under the Equal
Protection Clause is not dependent upon the race of those burdened or benefitted by a
particular classification"') (quoting Croson, 488 U.S. at 494).
33. See supra note 6.
34. Cf., eg., Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2105 ("[T]his case concerns only classifications
based explicitly on race, and presents none of the additional difficulties posed by laws that,
although facially neutral, result in disproportionate impact and are motivated by a racially
discriminatory purpose.").
35. One of us has argued that, under certain narrow circumstances, inferior courts
might properly decide cases before them based on anticipated future superior court rul-
ings. See Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. Rnv. 1 (1994). The required circumstances are
not satisfied here. See id. at 70-72 (courts should not anticipate the overruling of Supreme
Court precedents).
36. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,484 (1989).
rate the recent Supreme Court cases as the court applies each of the
two parts of the Hunter framework, which we now flesh out in more
detail.
H. Is the CCRI's Burden "Racial in Character"?
Understanding the first prong of the Hunter test requires a closer
look at how the Court has given it meaning in the trilogy. We there-
fore begin by carefully evaluating the Court's discussion of this prong,
and then we apply our conclusions to the CCRI.
A. The "Racial in Character" Test
At the outset we must make a point about nomenclature. In
describing and applying the first prong of the Hunter test, the Court
uses the terms "race-based," "racial in character," and "racial classifi-
cation" interchangeably, and in a peculiar and distinctive sense. A law
that employs a "racial classification" for purposes of the Hunter test
does not employ a "racial classification" for purposes of the conven-
tional equal protection framework described earlier in this Article.37
The facial use of a racial classification in that setting, it will be recal-
led, by itself triggers strict scrutiny. By contrast, a racial classification
in the Hunter sense does not trigger strict scrutiny unless that classifi-
cation is the basis for the imposition of a special political process bur-
den on racial minorities. This must be so, or else antidiscrimination
laws such as Title VII that (like the Akron charter amendment) em-
ploy the concept of "race" would themselves be constitutionally
suspect.
In an effort to clarify the discussion in this Article, we hereafter
use the phrase "racial in character" to denote a classification that is
racial within the meaning of the Hunter doctrine. Careful analysis of
the trilogy reveals that a law is "racial in character" in this sense if two
criteria are satisfied: (i) the law regulates a racial subject matter; (ii) it
has a racial impact, meaning it regulates the subject matter to the det-
riment of the racial minority.
The Court had a relatively easy time in Hunter concluding that
the Akron charter amendment targeted a racial subject matter, partly
on account of the amendment's explicit reference to "race" and
"color. 3 8 The Court had greater difficulty in Seattle, partly because of
37. See supra text accompanying note 11.
38. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 485 (arguing that Hunter was a clear and easy case, because
the imposition of the political process burden was accomplished in "explicitly racial
terms").
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the facial neutrality of Initiative 350. Unlike the charter amendment
in Hunter, the Washington initiative on its face did not mention race at
all. But after parsing all of the Initiative's exceptions, the Court con-
cluded that racial busing was the exclusive focus of the Initiative.39
In Crawford, the Court concluded that Proposition I was not "ra-
cial in character" in the Hunter sense because, among other things, the
Proposition made no textual reference to race. Rather, Proposition I
purported to deny state courts power to order pupil reassignment or
busing for any reason. And unlike Initiative 350, Proposition I was
not riddled with exceptions such that racial busing became its only
real application. As the Crawford Court observed, although busing
for integration purposes "prompted the initiation and probably the
adoption of Proposition I," the Proposition "is not limited to busing
for the purpose of racial desegregation, [but rather] applies neutrally
to 'pupil school assignment or pupil transportation' in general."40
So textual references to "race" (Hunter) and the fact that a law in
operation affects only "racial matters" (Seattle) are definitely relevant
to the prong-one inquiry. But perhaps more important is the related
inquiry into the effect that the challenged law will have on what the
Court perceives to be the interests of the minorities themselves. For
example, in Hunter, the Court made much of the fact that although
the charter amendment's popular approval gauntlet formally applied
to whites as well as blacks and to gentiles as well as Jews, "the reality
is that the law's impact falls on the minority."41 This is so, the Court
reasoned, because majorities ordinarily do not need the protection of
antidiscrimination laws, and thus lose very little by an amendment
that makes such laws less likely to be enacted.42
That these cases are about a real-world assessment identifying the
groups hurt by the challenged laws was made clear by the Court's
analysis in Seattle. After rejecting defendants' argument that Hunter
was necessarily inapposite because Initiative 350 nowhere mentioned
"race" or "integration," the Court addressed the contention that "bus-
ing for integration, unlike the fair housing ordinance involved in
Hunter, is not a peculiarly 'racial' issue at all."43 The Court began by
acknowledging that both whites and blacks stood on each side of the
Initiative 350 debate, and that both whites and blacks might benefit
39. Id. at 471-72.
40. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 538 n.18 (quoting text of Proposition I).
41. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391.
42. Id.
43. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 471-72.
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from school integration. The Court was, however, not moved by the
lack of complete racial bloc sentiment on the question of busing, and
gave two explanations for this. First, the Court observed that some
whites favored and benefitted from Akron's fair housing laws, so that
Hunter was not easily distinguishable on this score.44
More importantly, the Court in Seattle phrased the inquiry more
generally so as not to require an extremely tight correspondence be-
tween race and position on the issue. The critical question, said the
Court, was whether "desegregation of public schools, like the Akron
open housing ordinance, at bottom inures primarily to the benefit of
the minority, and is designed for that purpose. ' 45 Thus, some disa-
greement within the minority community does not necessarily mean
an issue cannot be "racial in character" for purposes of the Hunter
test. With the question pitched at this level of generality, the Court
had little trouble concluding that busing to accomplish integration,
though more "controvers[ial] than ... the sort of fair housing ordi-
nance debated in Hunter, . . . is legislation that is in [minorities']
interest. '46
Thus, the real-world impact of a challenged law on what the
Court perceives to be the interests of minorities seems to be the most
important aspect of the prong-one inquiry. In Crawford, the Court's
finding that Proposition I was not "racial" for Hunter-doctrine pur-
poses rested not only on the facial neutrality of the Proposition,47 but
also on the fact that the Proposition's effect on racial minorities was
completely unclear.48 This real-world assessment seems in tension
with the conclusions about the value to minorities of racial busing in
the Seattle opinion, though the Court's seemingly different empirical
conclusions might be explained by its perceptions of different
demographics in Seattle and Los Angeles.4 9 In any event, the Craw-
ford Court did not purport to take issue with the analytic framework
44. It is worth noting that the Court's invocation of Hunter here was not fully respon-
sive to the defendants' argument, because the Court did not (and probably could not eas-
ily) say that some blacks disfavored the Akron fair housing laws, in the same way that
some blacks disfavored racial busing. Seattle thus applied a somewhat looser test in this
regard.
45. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 472 (emphasis added).
46. Ide at 473-74 (citations omitted).
47. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 537.
48. Id
49. See id. at 537 n.16. On a related point, it is interesting to note that none of the
opinions in Seattle or Crawford analyzed the demographic breakdown of the people who
voted for and against Initiative 350 and Proposition 1.
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erected by Hunter and Seattle, but rather applied it and came out dif-
ferently on both prongs of the test.
The Court's careful focus on the real-world effect of the chal-
lenged law may at first glance seem odd, since the Court did not em-
ploy this finding in the familiar way, to support a direct finding of
invidious motivation under the conventional Washington v. Davis
equal protection framework. Indeed, even as the Court stressed the
adverse real-world impact of Initiative 350 on minorities in Seattle, the
Court eschewed any inquiry into invidious motive. 0
The Seattle Court's seeming concern with effects for their own
sake is, however, at some level consistent with an observation that
some scholars have made when looking at political rights cases gener-
ally (i.e., cases dealing with voting, officeholding, and jury service).
The suggestion is that disparate impact theory plays a more prominent
role in political rights cases than it does in other equal protection set-
tings. Actual inclusion of out-groups in political processes may be as
or more important to the Court than the subjective motivation behind
the challenged exclusionary devices.5'
But the concern over adverse effects on minority interests re-
flected in the Hunter cases should not be overread. As is explained in
much more detail in Section III below, the concern has not moved the
Court to question truly race-neutral political process devices, such as
the executive veto, that may tend systematically to disadvantage racial
minorities in the same way that they disadvantage all numerical mi-
norities. Thus, the "racial in character" prong of the Hunter doctrine
continues to require some meaningful showing that the challenged law
is peculiarly "racial"-not just in the sense that racial minorities may
not like it.
B. The CCRI Is "Racial in Character"
Applying the foregoing analysis, we believe that the CCRI is "ra-
cial in character" within the meaning of the Hunter line of cases. To
begin with, like the charter amendment in Hunter itself, the CCRI is
textually race-conscious. Moreover, as with the Akron charter
amendment, the real-world impact of the CCRI falls on minorities:
"Preferences" in favor of white males are illegal with or without the
CCRI. For these reasons, although some blacks, Latinos, and Asians
50. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 485.
51. See Vikram D. Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 COR-
NELL L. REv. 203,255-57 (1995); Daniel R. Ortiz, The Myth of Intent in Equal Protection,
41 STAN. L. REv. 1105, 1126-31 (1989).
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disfavor affirmative action today, and although affirmative action to-
day is often justified (as was busing in the 1970s) as benefitting all of
society, we think it still fair to say that affirmative action "inures pri-
marily for the benefit of minorities, and is designed for that pur-
pose."52 In short, enactment of the CCRI particularly hurts minorities
just as did the Akron charter amendment and Initiative 350. The
CCRI is also distinguishable from Proposition I in Crawford, with re-
spect to both facial neutrality and effects on minorities.53
But putting aside the mechanical operation of doctrine, are not
affirmative action programs intuitively different from antidiscimina-
tion laws of the kind at stake in Hunter? CCRI defenders might claim
that the Akron charter amendment seemed more "racial in character"
than the CCRI in that the charter amendment was designed to permit
people to use race in their business decisions, whereas the CCRI at-
tempts to make race irrelevant to decisionmaking. The preclusion of
antidiscrimination laws, defenders would continue, surely seems more
clearly linked to incontrovertible minority interests than does the pre-
clusion of racial preferences.
We have a number of responses. For starters, Seattle involved
more than mere antidiscrimination laws. It involved affirmative steps
taken to redress de facto segregation-steps that, like admissions, em-
ployment, and contracting preferences, make race relevant. In a very
meaningful sense, then, the busing at issue there was affirmative ac-
tion-and yet the Court applied Hunter to invalidate Initiative 350.
Indeed, the busing whose centralization was invalidated in Seattle
was arguably less basic to remedial objectives than are the affirmative
action programs foreclosed by the CCRI. This is so because after
Croson and other recent affirmative action cases, the majority of race
and sex "preference" schemes that are now permitted under federal
52. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 472.
53. Supporters might defend the CCRI by arguing that its antidiscrimination compo-
nent helps minorities, in that it flatly prohibits discrimination against them, instead of
merely subjecting such discrimination to the strict scrutiny test found in federal law. Such
help is more illusory than real, as there are probably no actual instances of discrimination
against racial minorities that pass strict scrutiny and therefore are uniquely prohibited by
the CCRI's antidiscrimination provision. We note also that in Hunter, charter amendment
supporters could have argued that the amendment helped minorities by making enactment
of Jim Crow housing segregation ordinances (including those that might satisfy strict scru-
tiny) more difficult. (Recall that the amendment covered all legislation dealing with dis-
crimination "on the basis of race," etc.) Similarly, Initiative 350 as a formal matter made it
more difficult for a locality to use busing to resegregate Seattle schools. These hypothetical
benefits to minorities did not prevent the Court from finding harm to minorities in Hunter
and Seattle, and they should not do so with respect to the CCRI either.
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equal protection doctrine (and thus the programs affected by CCRI)
are programs that are carefully designed to remedy past de jure dis-
crimination against women and persons of color.54 If minorities had
an important and "peculiarly racial" interest in remedying de facto
segregation in Seattle, it seems they should have an even stronger in-
terest in programs designed to redress de jure wrongs. Thus, the
CCRI is in some sense more appropriately deemed "racial in charac-
ter" under the Hunter doctrine than was Initiative 350.
In fact, this last point suggests further that the CCRI may not
really be so different from the Akron city charter amendment for pur-
poses of the first prong of the Hunter test. When we consider that the
affirmative action preferences eliminated by the CCRI are those
grounded in remedies for established wrongs (at least outside of the
education field), the gap between affirmative action and antidis-
crimination narrows. Could a lower court really draw a principled
line-in terms of what is in the "interest of minorities" 5 5-between
protection from discrimination and protection from its lingering
effects?
In response to this analysis, CCRI supporters might offer three
reasons why the CCRI does not impose a cognizable burden that is
"racial in character" under the Hunter test: (1) focus on the burden is
misplaced; (2) given the Court's current attitude about affirmative ac-
tion, the burden imposed is constitutionally insignificant; and (3) the
burden imposed is too general to be deemed "racial." We consider
each of these contentions in turn.
1. Is a Motive Inquiry More Appropriate?
The preceding analysis assumes that the Court's articulated doc-
trinal framework and reasoning should be taken at face value. Some
might question this assumption, suggesting that the Court in Hunter
and Seattle applied strict scrutiny only because the Court saw in the
initiatives some indicia of invidious intent. These indicia were not
enough to justify invalidation under the "unconstitutional motive" test
54. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 612 (1990) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("Modem equal protection doctrine has recognized only one ... interest [that
is compelling for purposes of strict scrutiny in this realm]: remedying the effects of racial
discrimination.").
Some have argued that diversity, as distinguished from remedying past discrimination,
may remain a proper basis for some race-conscious programs in the educational context.
See Amar & Katyal, supra note 6. But see Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.) (con-
cluding that diversity is not a compelling interest in higher education), cert. denied sub
nom. Thurgood Marshall Legal Soc. v. Hopwood, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
55. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 474; Hunter, 393 U.S. at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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of Washington v. Davis,56 but still enough to warrant invalidating the
initiatives by stretching somewhat prior equal protection doctrine to
encompass laws that are "racial in character." If Hunter and Seattle
are best understood as "soft intent" cases, perhaps the CCRI is not so
clearly vulnerable. 7
But we think it adventurous to read Hunter and Seattle as driven
primarily by a "soft intent" inquiry. It is always somewhat risky to
impute to the Supreme Court an unarticulated rationale in the face of
a carefully developed doctrinal framework; it is even more hazardous
when the Court has explicitly disavowed the proposed rationale.58
And the Court's articulated Hunter framework-with its concern for
effect rather than intent-does to some extent resonate with other
cases involving burdens on racial minorities in the exercise of political
rights such as voting and jury service.59 For these reasons, lower
courts cannot recharacterize the Hunter doctrine rationale in motive
inquiry terms.
2. In Light of Recent Cases, Does the Elimination of Affirmative
Action Programs Still Qualify as a Cognizable Racial
Burden?
Even accepting the Hunter framework as articulated, supporters
might defend the CCRI by arguing that the elimination of affirmative
action programs does not as clearly disadvantage racial minorities as
did the Hunter and Seattle initiatives. The effects of affirmative action
programs are ambivalent, CCRI supporters would claim, because such
programs generally hurt racial minorities in some ways even if they
help minorities in others. This challenges the notion that the pro-
grams terminated by the CCRI "inure[ ] primarily to the benefit of the
minority. 60
This defense would build on recent Supreme Court cases, which
assertedly support such an ambivalent characterization of affirmative
action programs. Over the past seven years, City of Richmond v. J.A.
56. 426 U.S. 229 (1976); see supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (identifying noninvidious motiva-
tions behind CCRI).
58. See, e.g., Seattle, 458 U.S. at 485 ("We have not insisted on a particularized inquiry
into motivation in all equal protection cases: 'A racial classification, regardless of pur-
ported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an extraordinary
justification.' And legislation of the kind challenged in Hunter similarly falls into an inher-
ently suspect category.") (citation omitted).
59. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
60. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 472 (emphasis added).
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Croson Co.61 and its progeny62 have justified strict scrutiny for pur-
portedly "benign" race-conscious programs in part through renewed
emphasis on certain costs that affirmative action programs threaten to
impose on minorities (whether uniquely or along with others). Ac-
cording to the Court, such programs threaten to embrace and "foster
harmful and divisive stereotypes, 63 which might "balkanize us into
competing racial factions."'  The CCRI, supporters would thus con-
tend, does not frustrate valued minority interests. Rather, the Initia-
tive simply moves California law in line with the Supreme Court's
disparaging attitude toward affirmative action programs.
This argument is superficially appealing, and it likely provides the
most plausible basis for rejecting the Hunter-based challenge to the
CCRI. Nevertheless, upon careful reflection, we believe that a faith-
ful reading of Hunter and Seattle still compels a lower court to charac-
terize the CCRI as imposing a cognizable "racial in character"
burden-Croson notwithstanding.
First, this defense of the CCRI reads too much into the Supreme
Court's recent affirmative action cases. Yes, the Court invoked strict
scrutiny because of the potential costs of race-conscious measures.
And, not surprisingly, the Court sounded unenthusiastic about such
programs-after all, in each of these cases the Court invalidated the
program under review for being too loosely tailored and thus contrib-
uting to racial stereotyping and social divisiveness.
But the proper question is not whether the class of all conceivable
or even historical affirmative action programs inures primarily to the
benefit of minorities; the question is whether the class of all constitu-
tional programs-the only ones foreclosed by the CCRI-inures to
their benefit. Programs that satisfr strict scrutiny do so precisely be-
cause the costs of stereotyping and polarization are avoided, or at
least are outweighed by the programs' benefits. The Court continues
to remind us that "[t]he unhappy persistence of both the practice and
the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in
this country is an unfortunate reality."65 When the Court agrees that
61. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
62. See cases cited supra notes 29-30.
63. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1963 (1996) (plurality opinion authored by Justice
O'Connor); see also Miller v. Johnson, 115 S. Ct. 2475, 2486 (1995) (classifications based on
stereotypes can be "offensive and demeaning" to minorities).
64. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) (Shaw 1).
65. Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2117 (1995); see also Shaw I, 509
U.S. at 656 (noting the "significant state interest in eradicating the effects of past racial
discrimination").
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a particular program achieves a "compelling" interest, it essentially
recognizes that the program does significantly assist the intended ben-
eficiaries. In short, nothing in Croson and its progeny casts aspersions
on the value and significance of constitutional affirmative action pro-
grams. For that reason, eradication of these programs-effected in
one fell swoop by the CCRI-must still be viewed as appreciably and
specially disadvantaging racial minorities. Thus, the CCRI does more
than bring California law in line with the Court's expressed attitude of
late; the CCRI takes California far beyond.
Second, the suggestion that contemporary affirmative action pro-
grams do not primarily benefit racial minorities cannot be squared
with the holding of Seattle. As explained earlier, Initiative 350 eradi-
cated racial busing designed to remedy de facto school segregation-a
race-conscious program that, in its day, was extremely controversial.66
Racial busing imposed both practical and emotional costs on black
schoolchildren, and it generated interracial divisiveness and even hos-
tility. For a lower court to uphold the CCRI without calling Seattle
into question (which the court could not legitimately do), the court
would have to find that the constitutional affirmative action programs
foreclosed by the CCRI impose greater costs than did integrative bus-
ing in 1982. Given the heated debate over busing's effects, and given
the complexity and variety of affirmative action programs today, any
such judicial finding would be quite ambitious, to say the least.
Finally, there is a more careful way to read the Supreme Court's
recent uncomplimentary descriptions of affirmative action programs,
one that is actually coherent with rather than in conflict with the hold-
ing in Seattle. The Court's disparaging language has been directed at
programs whose weak justification or poor design creates a propensity
to "balkanize" people of different races, dividing rather than integrat-
ing them.67 Significantly, the state laws invalidated in Hunter and Se-
attle also tended to frustrate, rather than promote, integration. 6s The
Court's invalidation of these laws thus dovetails with the central
theme of Croson and its progeny: The use of race by government is
66. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 646-47 ("In some exceptional cases, a reapportion-
ment plan may be so irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be understood as any-
thing other than an effort to 'segregat[e] . . . voters' on the basis of race.") (citation
omitted); id. at 647 (race-based districting with dramatically irregular shapes "bears an
uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid").
68. The Akron city charter amendment placed structural barriers in the way of hous-
ing antidiscrimination ordinances, which are obviously intended to encourage residential
integration of different races. Initiative 350 placed structural barriers in the way of racial
busing programs intended to integrate public schools.
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particularly disfavored when it contributes to (Croson), or makes sys-
tematically more difficult the remediation of (Hunter; Seattle), racial
divisions and balkanization.
We believe that under this "integration reading" of the cases, the
CCRI remains vulnerable to lower court invalidation. Defenders
would quickly point out that the CCRI does more than forbid race-
based integrative affirmative action; it also forbids segregative discrim-
ination against racial minorities, so that the overall effect on integra-
tion is mixed. But, as we noted earlier, the CCRI's antidiscrimination
component does precious little if anything beyond what the United
States Constitution already does. Not so with the antipreference com-
ponent, which forecloses a myriad of affirmative action programs. 69
While it is true that the CCRI does not (as did Initiative 350) target a
defined subset of racial preferences that tend to integrate, in reality
the programs the CCRI forecloses would tend to bring people of dif-
ferent races together, just like desegregative busing. Indeed, desegre-
gative busing-the very policy protected in Seattle-itself would be
forbidden by the CCRI.
So too would all race-based affirmative action in higher educa-
tion, a setting where the Court has already recognized that affirmative
action programs operate to bring people of all races together rather
than to segregate them.70 The CCRI also forecloses race-based af-
firmative action in government employment. As is true with educa-
tion, race-based programs in this area, whether grounded on remedy
or diversity rationales, have a profound tendency to bring people to-
gether, not to segregate them. Even affirmative action in government
contracts, if well conceived, can be designed to promote interaction
rather than balkanization. Yet, these programs are foreclosed. And if
a particular affirmative action program did tend to balkanize, it might
under recent cases be unconstitutional for that reason, and thus would
not be part of the class of programs the CCRI effectively forbids. In
other words, under a strong "integration reading" of Hunter, Seattle,
and more recent equal protection cases, only those affirmative action
schemes that avoided balkanization could survive strict scrutiny, and
thus only those programs would be meaningfully affected by the
CCRI. Indeed, under this reading the real difference between CCRI
69. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,323 (1978) (appendix
to opinion of Powell, J.); id- at 374 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, .,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). See generally Amar & Katyal,
supra note 6.
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and Initiative 350 cuts against the CCRI. Whereas Initiative 350 zer-
oed in on some race-based integration programs for special inferior
treatment, the CCRI is more ambitious, seeking to entrench a rejec-
tion of all race-based integration programs.
The foregoing suggests that the impulse to incorporate the les-
sons of the Court's recent affirmative action decisions when applying
the Hunter doctrine to the CCRI must be carefully tempered. It is
inappropriate for a lower court to read between the lines of Croson
and its progeny and adduce a principle that would, fairly applied, con-
flict with the holding of Seattle. Reading the recent decisions to reflect
an undifferentiated antagonism to all affirmative action programs fails
this test. In contrast, a more nuanced reading that distinguishes
among programs based on their integrative effects harmonizes the re-
cent cases with Seattle-and also confirms the constitutional vulnera-
bility of the CCRI.
3. Is the CCRI Sufficiently General to Avoid Being Deemed "Racial in
Character"?
Because the CCRI affects affirmative action for women as well as
for racial minorities, the class of citizens burdened extends beyond
race. This fact gives rise to two possible defenses of the CCRI.
First, CCRI supporters might argue that the inclusion of sex
makes the CCRI's regulatory scope more general, so that it cannot be
characterized as "racial in character" like the law in Seattle (which
explicitly isolated racial busing). But the entrenchment in Hunter in-
volved not just racial housing discrimination, but religious discrimina-
tion as well. Thus, there is no requirement that race be treated
completely uniquely from other criteria for Hunter to be implicated.
Surely the result in Hunter would not have changed had the special
voter approval requirement applied to all fair housing (or fair employ-
ment) laws regulating sex as well as race discrimination; if the coup-
ling of race and religion did not save the Akron charter amendment,
neither would the coupling of race and sex.
In any event, subdivision (c) 71 makes clear that although sex is
covered by the CCRI, it is treated somewhat differently. While subdi-
vision (a) dictates that race-based preferences are absolutely prohib-
ited, subdivision (c) suggests that sex-based preferences are not.72
71. See Proposition 209, supra note 1.
72. This is so because subdivision (c) provides that subdivision (a)'s seemingly abso-
lute prohibition of preferences (as well as discrimination) should not be interpreted to
prohibit "bona fide qualifications based on sex which are reasonably necessary to the nor-
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Thus, the CCRI's treatment of race is unique, just as was the treat-
ment of race in Seattle.
Second, CCRI supporters might contend that minorities and wo-
men together have sufficient political power to block the Initiative's
passage, and therefore racial minorities have no legitimate claim to
special judicial protection through strict scrutiny if the Initiative
passes anyway. This argument is sufficiently novel that we are una-
ware of any cases that are directly responsive. But we find it unper-
suasive. To begin with, because subdivision (c) may mean the CCRI
does not absolutely prohibit sex-based preferences, 73 women may not
necessarily have the same interests at stake as do racial minorities. In
any event, as a general matter the bundling of historically disadvan-
taged groups into a numerical majority should not save a law from
rigorous scrutiny. The fact that a burdened class lacks political power
due to small numbers is but one of several traditional justifications for
treating a legislative classification as "suspect" under equal protection
doctrine. 74 Consider, for example, facially discriminatory statutes that
explicitly disadvantage both racial minorities and women by imposing
direct burdens (such as a special sales tax or exclusion from jury ser-
vice). We believe, and are confident the Court would agree, that the
traditional rationales for strictly scrutinizing the explicitly racial com-
ponents of any such laws are not vitiated by the breadth of the victim
class.
The same should be true here, unless the rationales underlying
strict scrutiny in Hunter-type cases are weaker or more ephemeral. To
be sure, the Court did not explain in Hunter or Seattle whether the
rationales for strict scrutiny in cases involving explicit racial classifica-
tions and in Hunter-type cases are identical. But the Court gave no
hint that Hunter doctrine violations are any less deserving of judicial
remedy.75
mal operation of" the specified public programs. Id This means, for example, that while
the CCRI forbids all-black high school sports teams, it does not necessarily forbid all-girl
teams. Moreover, subdivision (c) might permit some traditional affirmative action pro-
grams for women; for example, sex might be considered a bona fide qualification for the
"normal" operation of educational institutions based on the value of diversity.
73. See supra note 72.
74. The Supreme Court has recited numerous factors bearing on whether a discrete
class of persons deserves heightened judicial protection. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973);
see generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §16-23, at 1544-45
(2d ed. 1988).
75. Indeed, the Court has suggested that Hunter cases and more traditional cases in-
volving explicit racial lines raise the same concerns. See the Court's language in Seattle
quoted supra note 58.
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In the end, a lower court cannot fairly avoid the conclusion that
the CCRI is "racial in character" within the meaning of the Hunter
framework. This framework therefore dictates that the CCRI be sub-
jected to strict scrutiny if it also uniquely entrenches a political process
burden on racial minorities. We now take up that inquiry.
HI. Does the CCRI ]Impermissibly Entrench an Unequal
Political Burden?
The Court accepted in Hunter and Seattle, and rejected in Craw-
ford, equal protection challenges to plebiscites that allegedly imposed
special "political process burdens" on the ability of racial minorities to
achieve beneficial legislation. We believe that the most analytically
coherent doctrinal interpretation of the trilogy suggests that the
CCRI-because it will (if enacted) be entrenched in California's Con-
stitution-suffers the same infirmity as the initiatives invalidated in
Hunter and Seattle, and that Crawford is distinguishable in a princi-
pled way. We recognize, however, that our assimilation of the CCRI
to the Hunter-Seattle side of the line, like our conclusion that the
CCRI is "racial in character," requires the exercise of some political
judgment built into the doctrinal framework.
Our four-part analysis proceeds as follows. Section A further
elaborates the political and doctrinal vision that underlies the burden
analysis in Hunter and Seattle. It then explains why, at least as a prima
facie matter, the rationale of Hunter-Seattle applies to the CCRI as
well. Section B discusses and rejects a procedure-substance distinc-
tion that some may advance to distinguish the CCRI from the laws
struck down in Hunter and Seattle. Section C evaluates Crawford, ex-
plains and justifies the Court's distinction between that case and
Hunter-Seattle, and explains why Crawford does not support the con-
stitutionality of the CCRI. Finally, Section D considers a defense of
the CCRI rooted in a theory of constitutionalism, a defense that we
believe undergirds a widespread intuition that the CCRI must be per-
missible. We conclude that this argument is not easy to defend
doctrinally.
A. The CCRI's Entrenchment of Political Process Burdens
Hunter and Seattle reflect what might be called a "political pro-
cess" concern embedded within equal protection jurisprudence. Much
equal protection law is concerned with policing the process of political
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representation and decisionmaking. 76 As noted by Justice Stone in his
famous Carolene Products footnote four,77 conventional political
processes may become dysfunctional when interests of racial minori-
ties are at stake. Thus courts must take special care to ensure that
racial minorities at the very least enjoy access to political power on
equal terms with the rest of the population. As the Court observed in
Seattle:
[W]hen the State's allocation of power places unusual burdens
on the ability of racial groups to enact legislation specifically
designed to overcome the "special condition" of prejudice [ar-
guably including affirmative action], the governmental action se-
riously "curtail[s] the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities" [citing
Carolene Products]. In a most direct sense, this implicates thejudiciary's special role in safeguarding the interests of those
groups ....
Within this tradition of special political process-based scrutiny,
Seattle and Hunter thus represent efforts by the Court to protect
against the allocation of political rights in a manner that peculiarly
disadvantages racial minorities by entrenching into law norms harmful
to minorities' interests.
In both Hunter and Seattle, the Court identified circumstances in
which the structuring of democratic processes unconstitutionally bur-
dens the political power or access of racial minorities. More specifi-
cally, the Court distinguished between "neutral" and "nonneutral," or
"racial," burdens on political power. As the Court explained in
Seattle:
[Our] cases yield a simple but central principle. As Justice
Harlan noted while concurring in the Court's opinion in Hunter,
laws structuring political institutions or allocating political
power according to "neutral principles"-such as the executive
veto, or the typically burdensome requirements for amending
state constitutions-are not subject to equal protection attack,
though they may "make it more difficult for minorities to
76. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964). See generally JomN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dis-rnusr (1980).
77. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938) ("Nor
need we enquire.., whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry.") (citations omitted).
78. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 486 (citation omitted). See also id ("[M]inorities are no less
powerless with the vote than without it when a racial criterion is used to assign governmen-
tal power in such a way as to exclude particular racial groups 'from effective participation
in the political proces[s]."') (citation omitted).
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achieve favorable legislation." Because such laws make it more
difficult for every group in the community to enact comparable
laws, they "provid[e] a just framework within which the diverse
political groups in our society may fairly compete." Thus, the
political majority may generally restructure the political process
to place obstacles in the path of everyone seeking to secure the
benefits of governmental action.79
Not only may a state employ political structures that generally
disadvantage numerical minorities (and hence racial minorities) on all
subjects, but the state may also employ different structures for differ-
ent subjects-again, so long as there is a neutral principle justifying
the distinctions drawn.80 Similarly, a state may allocate policy deci-
sions on different subject matters to different interior levels of state
government, dictating, for example, that decisions on one subject be
made by local governments and decisions on another subject be made
by the state legislature.81
But, as the Court in Seattle continued:
A different analysis is required when the State allocates govern-
mental power nonneutrally, by explicitly using the racial nature
of a decision to determine the decisionmaking process. State ac-
tion of this kind, the Court said [in Hunter], "places special bur-
dens on racial minorities within the governmental process,"
thereby "making it more difficult for certain racial... minorities
[than for other members of the community] to achieve legisla-
tion that is in their interest." Such a structuring of the political
process, the Court said, was "no more permissible than [is] de-
nying [members of a racial minority] the vote, on an equal basis
with others."'
At its core, then, the Hunter doctrine is designed to protect racial mi-
norities against political burdens imposed specially on them, which
frustrate their equal access to the reins of political power.
This principle does not, of course, protect minorities from losing
any or even all political battles, so long as the political process is fair.
The Court has repeatedly insisted that the "mere repeal" of a law ad-
79. ld. at 469-70 (citations omitted).
80. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (rejecting challenge to California
constitutional amendment requiring referendum approval for all low-rent public housing
projects). In James, the Court noted that "[b]ut of course a lawmaking procedure that
'disadvantages' a particular group does not always deny equal protection. Under any such
holding, presumably a State would not be able to require referendums on any subject un-
less referendums were required on all, because they would always disadvantage some
group." Id. at 142.
81. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 476 ("States traditionally have been accorded the widest
latitude in ordering their internal governmental processes .. .
82. Id. at 470 (citations omitted).
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vantaging racial minorities (such as an affirmative action program) by
the same entity that originally enacted it does not trigger heightened
scrutiny.83 This doctrinal rule serves compelling policy justifications;
were the rule otherwise, "[s]tates would be committed irrevocably to
legislation that has proved unsuccessful or even harmful [to both mi-
norities and majorities] in practice."8'
More significantly for present purposes, the rule that "mere re-
peal" by the enacting governmental entity does not trigger strict scru-
tiny is consistent with, and reflects the central message of, Hunter-
Seattle. Repeal of a law by the enacting governmental entity reflects
the normal operation of the political process in which there are win-
ners and losers. Repeal of legislation favorable to the interests of a
racial minority simply indicates that a prior winner has now lost. The
repeal thus substantively disadvantages the racial minority. But the
repeal itself does not alter or distort the existing political process in
any way. Nor does it suggest that the existing process is racially bi-
ased; by hypothesis, the racial minority previously succeeded in
achieving favorable legislation, revealing its ability at least sometimes
to exercise power effectively at this particular level of government.
Thus, the antiminority decision is in no meaningful way entrenched,
the central concern of the Court in these cases.
In Hunter and Seattle, the initiatives under review worked more
than a mere repeal of legislation favorable to a racial minority. They
also operated (albeit in different ways) to frustrate the effective polit-
ical power of a racial minority by restructuring the political system.
Specifically, the rejection of favorable legislation was entrenched be-
cause roadblocks were placed in the path of future laws. In both
cases, the Court reaffirmed that a state or city may freely remove
political authority generally from lower to higher levels within the in-
trastate governmental hierarchy. But a state may not so remove polit-
ical authority in a manner that is "racial in character"-even (as in
Hunter) where that removal is back to the people themselves-be-
cause such a move might entrench the antiminority policy and thus
preclude equal participation in political decisionmaking. As the Court
explained in Hunter:
83. See, e.g., Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 539 (1982) ("[T]he simple
repeal or modification of desegregation or antidiscrimination laws, without more, never
has been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial classification."); see also Seat-
tle, 458 U.S. at 483; Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 531 n.5 (1979).
84. Crawford, 458 U.S. at 539. The Court did caution that "[o]f course, if the purpose
of repealing legislation is to disadvantage a racial minority, the repeal is unconstitutional
for this reason." Id. at 539 n.21 (emphasis added).
Even though Akron might have proceeded by majority vote at
town meeting on all its municipal legislation, it has instead cho-
sen a more complex system. Having done so, the State may no
more disadvantage [a minority] group by making it more diffi-
cult to enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any per-
son's vote or give any group a smaller representation than
another of comparable size. 5
Applying all these principles to the CCRI, we conclude that it
embodies the kind of political process burden on the exercise of mi-
nority political power that the Hunter doctrine forbids. In the past,
racial minorities have achieved favorable affirmative action legislation
in California through normal channels at both local and state govern-
mental levels. The CCRI would withdraw from these institutions the
political authority to enact preference programs. And the rejection of
these programs would now be entrenched in the most remote level of
government, the California Constitution. Adoption of preference
programs in the future would require a new constitutional amend-
ment. In the words of the Seattle Court as applied to the CCRI: "[The
CCRI], however, works something more than the 'mere repeal' of a
[preference] law by the political entity that created it. It burdens all
future attempts to [enact preference programs] throughout the State,
by lodging decisionmaking authority over the question at a new and
remote level of government. 's6
B. Procedure Versus Substance?
Some might try to invoke a procedure-substance distinction in an
effort to separate the CCRI from the initiatives found wanting in
Hunter and Seattle. In both of those cases, the Court's language re-
peatedly characterized the initiatives at issue as having "restructured"
the pre-existing political process to impose burdens that are "racial in
character."87 This repeated emphasis at least raises the possibility that
such explicit restructuring is conceived by the Court to be an integral
part of the unconstitutional burden driving the Hunter doctrine. In
85. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392-93; see also Seattle, 458 U.S. at 480 n.23 ("[T]he State
remains free to vest all decisionmaking power in state officials, or to remove authority
from local school boards in a race-neutral manner.... [W]hat we find objectionable about
Initiative 350 is the comparative burden it imposes on minority participation in the political
process . . . .") (emphasis added).
86. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 483.
87. See, e.g., id at 474 ("As in Hunter, then, the community's political mechanisms are
modified to place effective decisionmaking authority over a racial issue at a different level
of government.") (emphasis added); id. at 486 n.29 ("It is the State's race-conscious re-
structuring of its decisionmaking process that is impermissible, not the simple repeal of the
Seattle Plan.") (emphasis added).
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other words, one might argue, the Hunter doctrine prohibits states
from enacting initiatives that on their face directly restructure the pre-
existing political process in a manner that is "racial in character," but
does not similarly prohibit states from enacting initiatives that on their
face merely "work a simple change in policy," even if they incidentally
entrench the new policy.
We acknowledge that such a purported procedure-substance dis-
tinction might at first blush provide a plausible defense of the CCRI.
After all, on its face the CCRI looks more like a mere change of pol-
icy rather than a direct attempt to reallocate political power within the
state. Unlike the Akron charter amendment and Initiative 350, the
CCRI does not directly declare that it is withdrawing political author-
ity from one government level and vesting it solely in a higher one
(i.e., the constitutional amendment process). Nevertheless, for the
several reasons that follow, we do not believe that a procedure-sub-
stance distinction provides a viable and principled limitation on the
Hunter doctrine.
To begin with, a procedure-substance distinction seems unrelated
to the central conceptual inquiry underlying the Hunter cases. If the
Hunter doctrine were solely concerned about ferreting out laws that
were motivated by an intent to discriminate, then perhaps the proce-
durally oriented wording of an initiative might provide some proba-
tive evidence of an illicit intent. The more clearly the language spells
out a dual procedure which tends to work to the disadvantage of mi-
norities, the more suspicious a court might be that the electorate cared
about this disadvantage more than the underlying substantive policy
issues. However, as explained earlier, the Court has denied that the
Hunter doctrine concerns illicit motive in the traditional sense.88
Rather, the doctrine is more concerned with minorities' equal access
to effective political power,89 which should trigger a greater focus on
an initiative's effect than on its subjective intent. And with respect to
effect, the CCRI's withdrawal of political authority from lower
levels of government is unrelated to any procedure-substance
characterization.
Moreover, even if illicit motive remains part of the focus, the
"substance-packaging" of a constitutional amendment ought not to
significantly allay any concern about motive, because the amend-
ment's substantive effect is inherently intertwined with an alteration of
conventional decisionmaking processes. It is understandable that
88. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 41-51, 76-82 and accompanying text.
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CCRI supporters would want to enact a substantive ban on race and
sex preferences that would govern throughout the State. But one can
still ask: Why did CCRI supporters decide to implement their policy
position through a state constitutional amendment as opposed to
working through plebiscitary legislation or more conventional legisla-
tive channels? The answer seems clear: The supporters wanted to re-
move political power from the state legislature or local government to
amend or repeal the preference ban. In this sense, an intent to reallo-
cate political power is necessarily implied by a decision to enact a sub-
stantive policy at a higher level of decisionmaking than had been
utilized previously.
This point is nicely illustrated by Justice Scalia's dissent in Romer
v. Evans.9" He candidly observed that Colorado's Constitutional
Amendment 2 (which relocated political issues concerning homosexu-
als from the local to statewide constitutional level) was specifically
intended to dilute this group's erstwhile political clout:
[Homosexuals are as entitled to use the legal system for rein-
forcement of their moral sentiments as are the rest of society.
But they are subject to being countered by lawful, democratic
countermeasures as well.
That is where Amendment 2 came in. It sought to counter both
the geographic concentration and the disproportionate political
power of homosexuals by (1) resolving the controversy at the
statewide level, and (2) making the election a single-issue contest
for both sides.91
Thus, the purported distinction between substantive policy changes
and procedural restructuring is ephemeral; where the former goes be-
yond "mere repeal," the latter is necessarily implicated.
Perhaps most importantly for present purposes, the Court in Seat-
tle explicitly rejected a bright-line distinction between procedural and
substantive changes, which is consistent with the Court's general con-
cern for real-world effects and its rejection of formalism.92 Justice
Powell argued in his Seattle dissent that Initiative 350 operated more
90. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996).
91. Id. at 1634 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). It should be noted that
Amendment 2, unlike the CCRI, explicitly targeted a discrete minority, persons of homo-
sexual orientation. This difference does not bear, however, on the irrelevance of the proce-
dure-substance distinction presently under consideration.
92. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 474 ("[T]he practical effect of Initiative 350 is to work a
reallocation of power of the kind condemned in Hunter. The initiative removes the author-
ity to address a racial problem-and only a racial problem-from the existing decision-
making body, in such a way as to burden minority interests.") (emphasis added); cf. id. at
467 ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment... reaches 'a political structure that treats all indi-
viduals as equals,' yet more subtly distorts governmental processes in such a way as to place
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like a substantive policy change than a restructuring of the political
process:
In this case, unlike in Hunter, the political process has not been
redrawn or altered .... [T]he State's political system is not al-
tered when [the State] adopts for the first time a policy, conced-
edly within the area of its authority, for the regulation of local
school districts. And certainly racial minorities are not uniquely
or comparatively burdened by the State's adoption of a policy
that would be lawful if adopted by any school district in the
State.93
This language exactly tracks the defense of the CCRI described
above.
But the majority's response to Justice Powell's argument is quite
revealing:
It surely is an excessively formal exercise, then, to argue that the
procedural revisions at issue in Hunter imposed special burdens
on minorities, but that the selective allocation of decisionmaking
authority worked by Initiative 350 does not erect comparable
political obstacles. Indeed, Hunter would have been virtually
identical to this case had the Akron charter amendment simply
barred the City Council from passing any fair housing ordi-
nance, as Initiative 350 forbids the use of virtually all mandatory
desegregation strategies. Surely, however, Hunter would not
have come out the other way had the charter amendment made
no provision for the passage of fair housing legislation [at all],
instead of subjecting such legislation to ratification by
referendum.94
We can restate this final sentence to focus on a state constitution
rather than a city charter as follows: A substantive state constitutional
amendment prohibiting all racial preferences would be treated the
same under the Equal Protection Clause as would a procedural state
constitutional amendment submitting all statutes granting racial pref-
erences to ratification by referendum (which would clearly be uncon-
stitutional under Hunter). The Court's response to Justice Powell thus
makes clear that the precise mechanism through which ordinary polit-
ical channels are choked off, whether through indirect effect of sub-
stantive legal change or through direct reallocation of political
authority, is not salient for purposes of the Hunter doctrine.
special burdens on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation.") (em-
phasis added) (citation omitted).
93. Ild. at 497-98 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Rehnquist and O'Connor, JJ.,
dissenting).
94. Id. at 474-75 n.17.
Our conclusion here is also buttressed by Reitman v. Mulkey.95
In Reitman, the Supreme Court invalidated an initiative-based amend-
ment to the California Constitution, according to which the people
retained the right to refuse to sell or lease property for any reason,
including racial reasons. The Court explained that the initiative would
"significantly encourage and involve the State in private discrimina-
tions" in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. 6 The Court's ra-
tionale would seem not to survive more recent decisions clarifying
unconstitutional purpose analysis, e.g., Washington v. Davis," though
the Court occasionally still refers to Reitman as if it were based on
such an analysis.98 Reitman is more coherently understood as a pre-
cursor to Hunter, because the initiative in Reitman clearly suffered
from the same structural defect.99 If this reading of Reitman is the
best one (and defending the result in Reitman any other way is diffi-
cult), then a procedure-substance distinction is difficult to maintain
insofar as the initiative in Reitman could not have been more
substantive.
For the aforementioned reasons, we believe that the CCRI can-
not meaningfully be distinguished from the initiatives invalidated in
Hunter and Seattle along some procedure-substance line. At its core,
the Hunter doctrine reflects concern about indirect as well as direct
ways in which majorities might visit special political process burdens
on racial minorities, thus precluding their equal access to the "chan-
nels of political change" (to quote John Ely). 100 This rationale applies
to the CCRI as well.
C. Reconciling Crawford with Hunter and Seattle
Superficially, Crawford seems to establish some limiting principle
to the reach of the Hunter doctrine, one that might appear to save the
CCRI because it, like Proposition I, is a constitutional amendment
that is (arguably) packaged as a substantive policy change rather than
an alteration of political process. On closer examination, however,
Crawford represents an unexceptional application of the "mere re-
95. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
96. Id. at 381.
97. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
98. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 539 n.21 (1982).
99. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 376-77 (noting that the initiative worked more than "the
mere repeal" of state antidiscrimination statutes because "[t]he right to discriminate, in-
cluding the right to discriminate on racial grounds, was now embodied in the State's basic
charter, immune from legislative, executive, or judicial regulation at any level of the state
government").
100. See ELY, supra note 76.
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peal" rule. Proposition I simply worked a repeal, by the enacting en-
tity, of a substantive constitutional norm favorable to racial minorities.
It did not, by word or effect, withdraw pre-existing or future political
authority from lower levels of government.
Proposition I proclaimed that "nothing contained herein or else-
where in this Constitution imposes upon [any state actor] any obliga-
tions or responsibilities which exceed those imposed by the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pu-
pil transportation."10' This language serves to clarify the meaning of
the California Constitution's pre-existing guarantees of equal protec-
tion, in essence overruling (the functional equivalent of "repealing")
prior state court rulings to the contrary.
Proposition I's next provision reworded this same mandate in a
manner focused directly on state court authority: "In enforcing this
subdivision or any other provision of this Constitution, no court of this
state may impose upon [any state actor] any obligation or responsibil-
ity with respect to the use of pupil school assignment or pupil trans-
portation [unless a federal court could do so under federal decisional
law to remedy a violation of the federal Equal Protection Clause]."' 02
The petitioners in Crawford seized upon this second provision and ar-
gued that the Proposition, like Initiative 350 in Seattle, operated to
withdraw effective political authority from a "lower level" of govern-
ment (the state courts), reserving it to a more remote level (the state
constitution).
But Justice Powell's majority opinion rejected "petitioners' char-
acterization of Proposition I as something more than a mere re-
peal."'0 3 In fact, the majority characterized Proposition I as "less than
a 'repeal' of the California Equal Protection Clause," noting that "the
State Constitution still places upon school boards a greater duty to
desegregate [through avenues other than busing] than does the Four-
teenth Amendment. 1 0 4 The Court then continued as follows:
Nor can it be said that Proposition I distorts the political process
for racial reasons or that it allocates governmental or judicial
power on the basis of discriminatory principle .... Remedies
appropriate in one area of legislation may not be desirable in
another.... Yet a "dual court system"--one for the racial ma-jority and one for the racial minority-is not established simply
101. See Crawford, 458 U.S. at 532 n.6.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 540.
104. Id. at 541.
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because civil rights remedies are different from those available
in other areas....
In short, having gone beyond the requirements of the Federal
Constitution, the State was free to return in part to the standard
prevailing generally throughout the United States."5
The key conceptual point, albeit only implicit in the just-quoted pas-
sage, is that the government entity previously extending state constitu-
tional law beyond the requirements of the United States Constitution
was the people of California through the state constitution, such that
Proposition I represented a repeal by the same entity (the people) that
enacted the law favorable to racial minorities in the first place.
This key point was made more directly in Justice Blackmun's con-
curring opinion, joined by Justice Brennan. The concurrence distin-
guishes Proposition I from the initiatives invalidated in Hunter and
Seattle as follows:
In my view, something significantly different is involved in this
case. State courts do not create the rights they enforce; those
rights originate elsewhere-in the state legislature, in the State's
political subdivisions, or in the state constitution itself. When one
of those rights is repealed, and therefore is rendered unenforce-
able in the courts, that action hardly can be said to restructure
the State's decisionmaking mechanism. While the California
electorate may have made it more difficult to achieve desegrega-
tion when it enacted Proposition I, to my mind it did so not by
working a structural change in the political process so much as
by simply repealing the right to invoke a judicial busing
remedy.' 6
To be sure, the premise that state courts do not themselves exercise
lawmaking power but rather merely "interpret" constitutional provi-
sions is highly formalistic. But it is precisely this formally correct
premise that justifies the Court's characterization of Proposition I as a
mere repeal.10 7
In sum, both the majority and concurrence agreed that Proposi-
tion I did not actually withdraw pre-existing decisionmaking authority
from a more accessible unit of government and entrench it at a less
accessible level, either directly or indirectly. Because the pre-existing
authority for court-ordered busing came not from local or state legis-
lation, but rather from judicial interpretations of the state constitu-
105. Id. at 541-42 (citations omitted).
106. Id. at 546 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (first and second emphases added).
107. See id. at 547 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("In short, the people of California-the
same 'entity' that put in place the State Constitution, and created the enforceable obligation
to desegregate-have made the desegregation obligation judicially unenforceable.") (em-
phasis added).
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tion's Equal Protection Clause itself, Proposition I merely replaced a
constitutional norm favorable to racial minorities with one that was
neutral. Importantly, and unlike the CCRI, Proposition I did not en-
trench its rule by precluding the state legislature or local school
boards from adopting busing programs beyond those required by the
federal or state constitutions' 0°-racial busing remained permissible,
just not constitutionally mandated. Thus, Crawford becomes an ex-
ceedingly easy case-which is consistent with the fact that its result
was supported by eight Justices, including four joining the majority in
Seattle. Crawford establishes no new limitation on the reach of the
Hunter doctrine; rather, it merely applies the "mere repeal" principle
already inherent from the beginning. 0 9
Reading Crawford in conjunction with Hunter and Seattle, then,
we are left with the following consistent principles. A state constitu-
tion may be amended so as to repeal or modify pre-existing constitu-
tional provisions, even those that have been interpreted in a manner
favoring a racial minority. But a state constitution may not be
amended in a direction that disadvantages the racial minority if the
effect of such amendment would be to withdraw pre-existing local or
state legislative authority in a manner that is "racial in character."
The CCRI falls squarely on the Hunter-Seattle side of this distinction.
We acknowledge that, so understood, the Hunter doctrine has
what some might perceive as a far-reaching consequence. With re-
spect to a given issue that is "racial in character," a state constitution
may either remain neutral or prescribe norms favorable to racial mi-
norities (which can later be repealed). But a state constitution can
never entrench a substantive norm with respect to an issue that is "ra-
cial in character" in a direction that disadvantages a racial minority.
For example, a constitution can mandate affirmative action, but it can
never selectively prohibit it and thus foreclose the possibility of mi-
nority success in more accessible political arenas.
While perhaps this conclusion sounds far-reaching when stated
this way, it is the conclusion dictated, we think, by the most coherent
108. Proposition I merely prohibited courts from imposing busing programs on the ba-
sis of the California Constitution.
109. Another way of putting our point here is as follows: The power of the people to
amend their state constitution so as to correct or revise what is perceived to be an errone-
ous or outdated judicial interpretation is an essential feature of popular sovereignty; other-
wise, judicial interpretations would be subject to revision only by later-appointed judges,
and only if the inertial influence of stare decisis could be overcome. Like the executive
veto, the power to amend is neutral with respect to race. So long as the power to amend is
not exercised in a manner that specially imposes a new burden on racial minorities, it does
not contravene federal equal protection principles.
reading of the cases. Moreover, the constraints this reading places on
the structure or substance of state constitutions may not be so great. It
merely means that when the people of a state want to entrench a sub-
stantive norm at a centralized level (such as the state constitution) and
the norm will be detrimental to the interests of racial minorities, the
people must take care to define the norm in a sufficiently general
way-to avoid the impression of a gerrymander, if you will-such that
the norm is not "racial in character" as defined earlier. It is not
enough for defenders to say that the CCRI is but one part of a bigger
state constitution that regulates a number of things, just as in Seattle it
was not enough to say (as did the losing Justices) that Initiative 350
was sufficiently general because racial busing was but one of many
issues withheld from local governments and reserved to the state level.
Instead, the CCRI is problematic because it singles out race for
unique treatment-no other education, employment, or contracting
criterion is removed from consideration by lower levels of govern-
ment-just as Initiative 350 treated race unlike any other criterion in
busing decisions. Hunter-Seattle's central premise bears repeating
here:
[T]he political majority may generally restructure the political
process to place obstacles in the path of everyone seeking to se-
cure the benefits of governmental action. But a different analy-
sis is required when the State allocates governmental power
nonneutrally, by explicitly using the racial nature of a decision to
determine the decisionmaking process. 110
D. The Propriety of Resolving Racial Controversy by Constitutional
Amendment
We have heard colleagues and other constitutional scholars de-
fend the CCRI based on a judgment that the social-political conflict
concerning the proper role of race and gender in governmental action
constitutes a matter fundamental to the self-definition of the State.
Even conceding (for purposes of argument) that the CCRI would
uniquely burden racial minorities' exercise of political power in con-
travention of the Hunter doctrine, they suggest that the CCRI never-
theless seems to be an appropriate response in an appropriate forum
to a longstanding social conflict. At least in this context, then, a
boundary must be placed on the Hunter doctrine's reach so as to pro-
tect state constitutional amendment from challenge.
110. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 470 (1982) (first and second
emphases added).
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This judgment appears to be based' on an impressionistic theory
of constitutionalism, which holds that certain subject matters are fun-
damental to the self-definition of a political community, and it is in-
herently proper for a state's foundational charter to address these
matters. The role of race in our political tradition has long been con-
sidered a central and defining feature of American constitutionalism.
Indeed, both the federal and state constitutions have long included
equal protection and other provisions aspiring to define the relation-
ship between majority rule and racial minority participation.
Moreover, because a constitutional amendment is at stake, de-
bate over the CCRI might well reflect a transcendence of conven-
tional politics and instead reflect the grappling with a divisive issue of
a people who fully recognize the fundamental moral and social signifi-
cance of this "constitutional moment."11' Therefore, this impression-
istic argument concludes, it seems entirely appropriate to allow
constitutional resolution of this central controversy of the day through
the CCRI, Hunter and Seattle notwithstanding.
Although we recognize that this argument has some rhetorical
force, as a doctrinal matter the position seems unsupported. First,
federal constitutional caselaw does not suggest that state constitu-
tional amendments (by plebiscite or otherwise) deserve less rigorous
scrutiny than other state laws. There is no hint in Crawford that Prop-
osition I deserved more deferential review than did Initiative 350 be-
cause only the former was a constitutional amendment. Likewise,
Reitman offered no hint that Amendment 2 deserved special defer-
ence because of its constitutional status." 2
This impressionistic defense of the CCRI also fails to appreciate
fully the fact that states' sovereignty is limited in our system by the
supremacy of federal law. Were states the ultimate sovereigns, then a
theory of state constitutionalism could comprehensively dictate when
a state charter is an appropriate forum for resolving a particular so-
cial-political controversy. But within our federal structure, all state
laws-including constitutional ones-are subordinate to federal prin-
ciples. And the federal principles underlying the Hunter doctrine sug-
gest that a state's decision to constitutionalize a norm that is "racial in
111. See Bruce Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE
L.J. 1013 (1984) (distinguishing between moments of "normal politics" and "constitutional
moments"-the latter being periods of time in which the people rise above parochial con-
cerns and conscientiously resolve foundational constitutional issues based on "high legal
principle").
112. Nor did the Court in Romer ever suggest in invalidating Colorado's Amendment 2
that it deserved any special deference because of its constitutional status.
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character" against a racial minority's interests poses the greatest possi-
ble threat to equal protection values because it removes governance
of the issue to the most remote level at which racial minorities are
least likely to be capable of electoral success.
But perhaps most importantly, any claim that the CCRI deserves
unique deference as a long-awaited resolution of deep-seated moral
and social controversy cannot easily be squared with Seattle, which
invalidated the people of Washington's attempt to resolve the equally
contentious issue of busing for desegregative purposes." 3 Given the
centrality of Brown v. Board of Education"4 to both constitutional
vision and political life through the 1960s and 1970s, surely busing was
considered the foundational issue connecting race and democracy in
1982 when Seattle was decided. While perhaps the passage of time
makes it difficult to conjure up vivid memories and sensations of that
era, we are not persuaded that today's affirmative action controversy
can fairly be characterized as any more "foundational," nor more
likely to engender conscientious and high-minded debate as opposed
to partisan politics or even prejudice, than was yesterday's busing
controversy.
IV. The CCRI and Strict Scrutiny
Because the CCRI entrenches a political process burden that is
"racial in character," the CCRI violates the Equal Protection Clause
unless it can survive strict scrutiny. For this to happen, a court would
have to find the CCRI narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest. It is difficult to assess the CCRI under this standard, because
we do not yet know the full panoply of supposedly compelling inter-
ests that the Initiative's supporters will claim on its behalf. Unlike the
proposition upheld in Crawford, the CCRI contains no statement of
purposes or justifications. 1 5 Presumably, the primary interests that
supporters will claim are those we mention in Part I of this Article.116
Based on the justifications we can anticipate today, we do not
believe that a court could, consistent with Supreme Court precedent,
113. While Seattle did not involve a state constitutional amendment per se, Initiative
350 passed by the people of Washington was superior to ordinary law in that it could not be
repealed by the state legislature within two years of its enactment, and could be amended
during that time only with the concurrence of two-thirds of each legislative house. Seattle,
458 U.S. at 462 n.4.
114. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
115. Compare CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 5 (listing several "compelling public interests"
served by Proposition I).
116. See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
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find the CCRI to survive strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court has been
reluctant to identify interests sufficiently compelling to support racial
preferences. We think the Court would be even less generous in iden-
tifying interests sufficiently compelling to support measures that dis-
criminate against traditional suspect classes. Indeed, the Court's
recent observations that strict scrutiny need not be fatal have not been
made in any case involving discrimination against a minority.
Nevertheless, here again we recognize the potential influence of
political judgment. We have never been sure exactly how a court
knows whether an asserted interest is "compelling," and a court might
interpret the Supreme Court's reluctance to embrace affirmative ac-
tion as a signal that the Court finds color blindness to be, if not quite
required absolutely by the Fourteenth Amendment, at least an over-
riding social norm. We thus recognize that a court might be tempted
to conclude that the CCRI is a narrow means of promoting the com-
pelling interest of establishing a "just" political regime. To do so,
however, a lower court would have to read recent cases as having ef-
fectively overruled Seattle, which the court could not do.
V. Conclusion
While Hunter was probably perceived in its time to be a relatively
easy case, Seattle was decided by a single vote.117 Subsequent deci-
sions in the race-relations area reflect a more formal and less context-
sensitive approach to equality doctrine than that underlying the
Hunter framework. Although we believe there are some strong, con-
sistent themes that connect Hunter and Seattle to recent decisions,"18
the volatility of modern doctrine makes difficult any prediction of the
ultimate fate of the Hunter cases.
Our focus in this Article, however, is on state and lower federal
courts that might be called upon in the near future to determine the
constitutionality of the CCRI. Upon close examination, the various
proffered distinctions between the CCRI and the initiatives invali-
dated in Hunter and especially Seattle prove difficult to defend in a
principled fashion. There are, of course, constitutional ways to dises-
tablish affirmative action programs throughout California. But under
the present law of the land, the CCRI does not appear to be one of
them.
117. Of the Justices sitting today, Justice Stevens was in the majority, and Justices
Rehnquist and O'Connor were in dissent.
118. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
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